Last edited by Mezidal
Thursday, August 6, 2020 | History

5 edition of Other-regarding preferences and performance pay found in the catalog.

Other-regarding preferences and performance pay

Eriksson, Tor

Other-regarding preferences and performance pay

an experiment on incentives and sorting

by Eriksson, Tor

  • 117 Want to read
  • 27 Currently reading

Published by IZA in Bonn, Germany .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Merit pay

  • Edition Notes

    Statementby Tor Eriksson, Marie-Claire Villeval.
    SeriesDiscussion paper ;, no. 1191, Discussion paper (Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit : Online) ;, no. 1191
    ContributionsVilleval, M. C.
    Classifications
    LC ClassificationsHD5701
    The Physical Object
    FormatElectronic resource
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL3478879M
    LC Control Number2005619105

    Our study presents evidence that social comparison influences both the level of pay and the degree of performance sensitivity within firms. We report pay patterns among division managers of large, multibusiness firms over a year period. These patterns are consistent with employees comparing pay against both their peers (horizontal comparison) and the chief executive officer Cited by: 9. How Should Pay Be Linked to Performance? Online forum now CLOSED. Professor Jim Heskett → → →.

    Incentive pay, also known as "pay for performance" is generally given for specific performance results rather than simply for time worked. While incentives are not the answer to all personnel challenges, they can do much to increase worker performance.. In this chapter we discuss casual and structured incentives. Despite the increasing popularity of comparative work on other-regarding preferences, the implications of different models of altruism are not always fully understood. This article analyzes different theoretical approaches to altruism and explores what empirical conclusions we should draw from them, paying particular attention to models of redistribution preferences where Cited by:

    Other-regarding preferences and management styles Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 88 The Impact of Korean SMEs' R&D Effort on Innovation - The Moderating Effects of Government Policy Supports -Cited by: Here, we're going to take a look at our Performance Preferences, and these preferences are obviously important because who doesn't want Photoshop to perform at its peak? These preferences, they're also dynamic. They're tapping into your own specific hardware configuration. These will then help you try to figure out how you can best set these up so .


Share this book
You might also like
Survey of the impacts of voluntary load appeals in the PG&E service territory

Survey of the impacts of voluntary load appeals in the PG&E service territory

A satyr against injustice, or, Sc--gs upon sc--gs

A satyr against injustice, or, Sc--gs upon sc--gs

Intra-stream movement, feeding habits, and population of the coastrange sculpin, cottus aleuticus, in relation to eggs of the pink salmon, oncorhynchus gorbuscha, in Alaska

Intra-stream movement, feeding habits, and population of the coastrange sculpin, cottus aleuticus, in relation to eggs of the pink salmon, oncorhynchus gorbuscha, in Alaska

Crisis? What crisis? Orderly workouts for sovereign debtors

Crisis? What crisis? Orderly workouts for sovereign debtors

Reborn on the fourth of July

Reborn on the fourth of July

Leather, England & Wales.

Leather, England & Wales.

Large dish 1987.

Large dish 1987.

Harmonys journey

Harmonys journey

Understanding voluntary organizations

Understanding voluntary organizations

Shakespeares The tragedie of Julius Caesar

Shakespeares The tragedie of Julius Caesar

Free expression rights of students in newspapers and other curricular activities

Free expression rights of students in newspapers and other curricular activities

Democracy marches

Democracy marches

Anoush, Gikor and others

Anoush, Gikor and others

Other-regarding preferences and performance pay by Eriksson, Tor Download PDF EPUB FB2

This paper reports results of a laboratory experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that (i) the opportunity to switch to piece-rate increases the average level of output and its variance; (ii) there is a concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated.

Experimental evidence shows that (i) the opportunity to switch to piece-rate increases the average level of output and its variance; (ii) there is a concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay.

Other-regarding preferences. its variance; (ii) there is a concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay.

Other-regarding preferences influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay.

Other-regarding preferences influence both the provision of incentives and their sorting effect. other-regarding preferences play a d ecisive ro le both in the provision of incentives, and in the incentive and sorting effects of variable pay.

The hypothesis Other-regarding preferences and performance pay book the role of other-regarding. Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting. Experimental evidence shows that (i) the opportunity to switch to piece-rate increases the average level of output and its variance; (ii) there is a concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay.

Other-regarding preferences Author: Tor Eriksson and Marie Claire Villeval. Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting June Author: villeval Last modified by: Created Date: 6/3/ PM Document presentation format: Affichage à l'écran Company: CNRS Other titles.

Handbook > Trust, Fairness, and Reciprocity > Useful Concepts> > Other-Regarding Preferences. Printer Friendly. Other-Regarding Preferences. Other-regarding preferences refer to preferences over another individual's material payoffs, in addition to one's own.

Such preferences incorporate notions of fair divisions. Probably the simplest model of other regarding preferences that goes beyond pure altruism is the inequality aversion model, popularized in the late s by Fehr and Schmidt [] and Bolton and Ochenfels [].File Size: KB.

CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute.

Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research.

have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and su cient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy.

Given separability, it is impossible to identify other-regarding preferences from market behavior: agents be. This study examines whether other-regarding preferences (ORPs) can predict cheating for different beneficiaries: cheating for-self, and other-regarding cheating for an in-group or an out-group member.

The results show that, on the one hand, more prosocial subjects cheat less for self compared to more proself by: 7. The basic assumption is that social (other-regarding) preferences, such as shame and compassion, is a function of previously offered incentive schemes.

I show that it may be optimal to offer incentives based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) in both periods in the dynamic (two-period) setting, even if team incentives, i.e.

joint Cited by: 1. Other-regarding preferences and management styles Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization – April with 39 Reads How we measure 'reads'.

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences performance contract that creates inequality when their performance outcomes are differ-ent. The optimal contract depends on the nature of the agents’ other-regarding preferences. incentives through a higher pay upon the success of the project.

However, higher-poweredCited by: Other-regarding preferences and performance pay. An experiment on incentives and sorting. Discussion Paper No.Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.

We identify individual other-regarding preferences of managers and determine the impact of other-regarding preferences on managers’ choices by controlling for these preferences in our experiment.

We also explore whether individual demographic characteristics, motivation of managers, and team performance influence the choice of a management by: Tor Eriksson & Marie Claire Villeval, "Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting," Post-Print halshs, HAL.

Tor Eriksson & Marie Claire Villeval, "Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay. Introduction to Trust, Fairness, Reciprocity and Other-Regarding Preferences. Economists typically assume that someone makes a decision by considering only how the decision's outcome will affect his own material payoff.

Own-Consumption Preferences from Other-Regarding Preferences Under what conditions can one speak of preferences for own as the most he will pay to purchase an item) and each seller sets an asking price (interpreted as the least she will accept to produce the item).

Other-Regarding Preferences in Markets Joel Sobel. MARKET CLEARING I Put. 'People, Performance & Pay' is must-read for all executives and HR professionals who want to understand the point-based pay system, known as the Hay Guide Chart-Profile Methodology.

With concrete examples from their consulting experiences, Thomas ry, David hter, and Paul Platten clearly explain how to develop compensation Cited by: the effects of other-regarding preferences in performance-pay settings.

Bartling and von Siemens () derive optimal incentive con-tracts for risk, inequality, and behindness averse agents in a moral hazard setting.

They find that behindness aversion increases the agency costs of providing incentives because agents suffer from both.